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An efficient high-capacity quantum secret sharing scheme is proposed following some ideas in
quantum dense coding with two-photon entanglement. The message sender, Alice prepares and
measures the two-photon entangled states, and the two agents, Bob and Charlie code their informa-
tion on their photons with four local unitary operations, which makes this scheme more convenient
for the agents than others. This scheme has a high intrinsic efficiency for qubits and a high capacity.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd; 03.67.Hk; 03.65.Ud; 89.70.+c
Quantum entanglement offers some novel ways for in-
formation processing and transmitting securely [1], such
as quantum computation [1], quantum teleportation [2],
quantum key distribution (QKD) [3, 4, 5, 6, 7], quan-
tum dense coding [8], quantum secure direct communi-
cation (QSDC) [9, 10], and so on. A surprising property
of an entangled quantum system is its nonlocality. Two
parts of the quantum system cannot be considered to be
independent even if they are far apart, and the single-
particle measurements on these two parts cannot give all
the information about the state of the whole quantum
system. Quantum nonlocality has been embodied in the
process of quantum teleportation [2], an important quan-
tum technique. Ekert exploited the nonlocality feature to
design a QKD protocol [3] in 1991, and Bennett, Bras-
sard and Mermin (BBM92) [4] simplified its error rate
analysis process in 1992. Also, quantum nonlocality has
been used to transmit a secret message directly [9, 10].
Secret sharing is a classical cryptographic scheme [11,
12, 13] in which a boss, say Alice suspects that one of
her two remote agents, say Bob and Charlie, may be
dishonest but she does not know who the dishonest one
is. She believes that the honest agent can prevent the
dishonest one from destroying her benefits if they act
in concert. For the security of her message MA, Alice
splits it into two pieces MB and MC , and sends them
to Bob and Charlie, respectively. The two agents can
read out the message MA = MB ⊕MC only when they
cooperate. As a classical signal can be copied perfectly, it
is impossible to create a private key with classical physics.
When quantum mechanics enters the field of information,
the story is changed. Quantum secret sharing (QSS) is
the generalization of classical secret sharing into quantum
scenario and has progressed quickly in recent years [14,
15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
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30, 31, 32, 33].
One of the main goals of QSS, similar to QKD, is
to distribute the private keys among the three partic-
ipants, or more generally, many participants securely
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. An
original QSS scheme was proposed by Hillery, Buzˇek and
Berthiaume [14] in 1999, which is called HBB99 hereafter.
In the HBB99 scheme [14], the secret sharing is accom-
plished by using a three-photon entangled Greenberger-
Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. Each participant holds a
photon from a GHZ state, and chooses randomly one
measuring-basis (MB) from the X-MB and the Y -MB to
measure their photons independently, similar to BBM92
QKD scheme [4]. Subsequently Karlsson, Koashi and
Imoto (KKI) put forward another QSS scheme [15] with
a two-photon polarization-entangled state. The photons
are polarized along the z or x directions, and the two
agents measure their photons choosing randomly one of
the two MBs, Z and X . The efficiency for qubits ηq ≡ quqt
in these two protocols [14, 15] is 50% because half of the
instances are discarded as the participants choose incom-
patible MBs, similar to the BBM92 QKD protocol [4].
Here qu is the useful qubits and qt is the total qubits
transmitted [6, 34]. Each entangled quantum system can
be used to carry on average a half bit of the random
common key, and two or more bits of classical communi-
cations are required to compare the correlation of their
MBs. Their total efficiency ηt is low; η is defined as [6, 34]
ηt =
bs
qt + bt
, (1)
where bs, qt and bt are the number of bits in the raw
key, the qubits transmitted, and the total classical bits
exchanged between the participants in the quantum com-
munication, respectively. For instance, the total effi-
ciency in HBB99 QSS scheme [14] with three parties is
at most ηt =
0.5
2+2 = 12.5% as the three parties trans-
mit a two-qubit (i.e., two particles in a three-particle
GHZ state) quantum system to create half bit of key
2at the expense of exchanging at least two bits of classical
information about their MBs. That is, Alice and Bob
(or Charlie) exchange a bit of information about Bob’s
(Charlie’s) MB, i.e., bt = 2. In KKI QSS scheme [15]
with three parties, the parties use a two-qubit quantum
system to obtain half bit of key in principle, i.e., its total
efficiency is at most ηt =
0.5
2+2 = 12.5%.
In this Letter, we present an efficient high-capacity
QSS scheme for distributing a random key among three
participants with a two-photon entangled state based on
quantum dense coding. The two agents, Bob and Charlie
choose the single-photon measurements on the sampling
photons with the three MBs Z, X and Y randomly for
eavesdropping check, and encode their information with
four local unitary operations on their photons. Almost
all the entangled states can be used to exchange the ran-
dom key and each two-photon entangled state can carry
two bits of information. Moreover, this scheme is se-
cure with the decoy photons and the classical informa-
tion exchanged is reduced largely as the participants al-
most need not compare their MBs for all the instances
except for those for eavesdropping check. The efficiency
for qubits ηq approaches 1 and the total efficiency ηt
approaches 50% (neglecting the instances for checking
eavesdropping, same as those in other QSS schemes) as
the two qubits are transmitted double the distance be-
tween the sender Alice and her agents, which equals four
qubits are transmitted in the KKI QSS scheme, and two
bits of key are created in theory.
An Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair is in one of
the four Bell states shown as follows.
|φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|+ z〉B|+ z〉C + | − z〉B| − z〉C)
=
1√
2
(|+ x〉B |+ x〉C + | − x〉B | − x〉C)
=
1√
2
(|+ y〉B| − y〉C + | − y〉B|+ y〉C),
|φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|+ z〉B|+ z〉C − | − z〉B| − z〉C)
=
1√
2
(|+ x〉B | − x〉C + | − x〉B |+ x〉C)
=
1√
2
(|+ y〉B|+ y〉C + | − y〉B| − y〉C),
|ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|+ z〉B| − z〉C + | − z〉B|+ z〉C)
=
1√
2
(|+ x〉B |+ x〉C − | − x〉B | − x〉C)
=
−i√
2
(|+ y〉B|+ y〉C − | − y〉B| − y〉C),
|ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|+ z〉B| − z〉C − | − z〉B|+ z〉C)
=
1√
2
(| − x〉B |+ x〉C − |+ x〉B | − x〉C)
=
i√
2
(|+ y〉B| − y〉C − | − y〉B|+ y〉C), (2)
where | + z〉 ≡ |0〉 and | − z〉 ≡ |1〉 are the eigenvectors
of the MB Z (for example the polarizations of a photon
along the z-direction), and | + x〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉 + |1〉) and
| − x〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) are those of the MB X . The
subscripts B and C indicate the two correlated photons
in each Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair. The four
local unitary operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) can transform
one of the Bell states into another,
U0 ≡ I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
U1 ≡ σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|,
U2 ≡ σx = |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|,
U3 ≡ iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|, (3)
where I is the 2 × 2 identity matrix and σi (i = x, y, z)
are the Pauli matrices, i.e.,
I ⊗ U0|ψ±〉 = |ψ±〉, I ⊗ U0|φ±〉 = |φ±〉,
I ⊗ U1|ψ±〉 = −|ψ∓〉, I ⊗ U1|φ±〉 = |φ∓〉,
I ⊗ U2|ψ±〉 = |φ±〉, I ⊗ U2|φ±〉 = |ψ±〉,
I ⊗ U3|ψ±〉 = |φ∓〉, I ⊗ U3|φ±〉 = −|ψ∓〉. (4)
The four Bell states can be used to carry two bits
of classical information [8, 9], but we cannot send the
photon pair directly into an insecure channel as the four
Bell states are the the simultaneous eigenvectors of the
two-body operators {σ(B)z σ(C)z , σ(B)x σ(C)x } and they can
be copied freely, which renders the transmission insecure.
To prevent an eavesdropper Eve from eavesdropping, one
way is not allowing Eve to acquire simultaneously both
photons in each EPR pair, such as those in the two-step
quantum communication scheme [6, 9] and its variant
[10]. Another method is to change the order of a group
of EPR pairs with two quantum channels so as to con-
fuse Eve the correct matching of the photons in the group
of EPR pairs, for instance that in the controlled-order-
rearrangement-encryption technique for QKD [7].
In QSS, if the participants can prevent the dishonest
agent, say Bob, from eavesdropping the quantum chan-
nel freely, any eavesdropper can be found out [15]. Sim-
ilar to Ref. [15], Alice can prepare each photon pair in
one of the nonorthogonal entangled states, which will
forbid the dishonest one to copy the quantum system
without disturbing it. To the end, Alice should pick out
two nonorthogonal bases to prepare the entangled pho-
ton pairs, similar to Bennet-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD
protocol [35]. Certainly, one set of basis for an entan-
gled photon pair is the four Bell states, shown in Eq (2).
Another set of basis can be chosen as follows.
|Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|+ x〉B |+ z〉C + i| − x〉B | − z〉C)
=
1√
2
(|+ z〉B|+ y〉C + | − z〉B| − y〉C)
=
e
−ipi
4√
2
(|+ y〉B| − x〉C + i| − y〉B|+ x〉C),
3|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|+ x〉B |+ z〉C − i| − x〉B | − z〉C)
=
1√
2
(|+ z〉B| − y〉C + | − z〉B|+ y〉C)
=
e
−ipi
4√
2
(|+ y〉B |+ x〉C + i| − y〉B| − x〉C),
|Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|+ x〉B | − z〉C + i| − x〉B |+ z〉C)
=
i√
2
(|+ z〉B| − y〉C − | − z〉B|+ y〉C)
=
e
i3pi
4√
2
(|+ y〉B| − x〉C − i| − y〉B|+ x〉C),
|Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|+ x〉B | − z〉C − i| − x〉B |+ z〉C)
=
−i√
2
(|+ z〉B|+ y〉C − | − z〉B| − y〉C)
=
e
−ipi
4√
2
(|+ y〉B | − x〉C + i| − y〉B|+ x〉C), (5)
where | ± y〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± i|1〉) are the two eigenvectors
of the MB Y. The four local unitary operations Ui (i =
0, 1, 2, 3) can transfer one of the four entangled states
{|Φ±〉, |Ψ±〉} into another, i.e.,
I ⊗ U1|Φ±〉 = |Φ∓〉, I ⊗ U1|Ψ±〉 = |Ψ∓〉,
I ⊗ U2|Φ±〉 = |Ψ±〉, I ⊗ U2|Ψ±〉 = |Φ±〉,
I ⊗ U3|Φ±〉 = −|Ψ∓〉, I ⊗ U3|Ψ±〉 = |Φ∓〉,
U1 ⊗ I|Φ±〉 = |Ψ∓〉, U1 ⊗ I|Ψ±〉 = |Φ∓〉,
U2 ⊗ I|Φ±〉 = |Φ∓〉, U2 ⊗ I|Ψ±〉 = −|Ψ∓〉,
U3 ⊗ I|Φ±〉 = |Ψ±〉, U3 ⊗ I|Ψ±〉 = −|Φ±〉. (6)
The two basis sets {|φ±〉, |ψ±〉} and {|Φ±〉, |Ψ±〉} are not
orthogonal, which forbids any one to copy them perfectly,
same as that in Ref. [15].
Now, let us describe the principle of our QSS scheme
in detail as follows.
(1). Alice, Bob and Charlie agree that each of the four
local unitary operations U0, U1, U2 and U3 represents the
two-bit information.
(2). Alice prepares the two photons B and C in one
of the eight nonorthogonal entangled states {|φ±〉, |ψ±〉,
|Φ±〉, |Ψ±〉} randomly. She sends the photon B to Bob
and C to Charlie.
For preventing the dishonest agent from eavesdropping
freely with an opaque attack [36], Alice sends a decoy
photon [37, 38], which is randomly in one of the six states
{|0〉, |1〉, | + x〉, | − x〉, | + y〉, | − y〉}, to each agent with
the probability pd (we give the reason for choosing decoy
photons below). Alice can prepare the decoy photon by
measuring one photon in the two-photon quantum sys-
tem which is in one of the two states {|φ+〉, |Φ+〉} with
the MB σz [38]. Also, she can produce it with an ideal
single-photon source [37, 38].
(3). Bob and Charlie choose one of the two modes,
a small probability pc (< 1/2) with the checking-
eavesdropping mode and a large probability 1 − pc with
the coding mode, for their photons received, similar to
those in the Refs. [9, 10, 39].
If Bob (Charlie) chooses the checking-eavesdropping
mode, Bob (Charlie) measures his photon by choosing
one of the three MBs Z, X and Y randomly; otherwise,
Bob (Charlie) encodes his random key on the photon
received with one of the four unitary operations {Ui}
(i = 0, 1, 2, 3). He sends the photon back to the sender
Alice.
(4) Alice takes a Bell-basis measurement on each
two correlated photons received from Bob and Charlie
with the two-photon entanglement basis {|φ±〉, |ψ±〉} or
{|Φ±〉, |Ψ±〉}, as the same as that she prepares them be-
fore the communication.
As the operations done by the agents on the quantum
system composed of the photons B and C do not change
its basis, the measurement done by Alice is deterministic
and will give out the outcome of the combination of the
unitary operations performed by Bob and Charlie, say
UA = UB⊗UC . Here UB and UC are the operations done
by Bob and Charlie, respectively. If the communication
is secure, each of the four unitary operations represents
two bits of classical information which can be used as the
raw key in QSS.
If one of the two agents, say Bob, measures his photon
and the other agent (Charlie) sends his photon back to
Alice, instead of encoding it, Alice will get nothing with
her Bell-basis measurement.
(5). Alice tells her agents which entangled basis has
been chosen for each EPR pair and completes the error
rate with the helps of her two agents.
She requires Bob and Charlie to publish the MBs and
the outcomes of the sample photons for which they choose
the checking-eavesdropping mode. Alice exploits the re-
fined error analysis technique [40] for checking eavesdrop-
ping of the process of the transmission from Alice to her
agents. That is, Alice only picks up the decoy photons
measured by the agents to check eavesdropping. As the
agents measure the decoy photons with the three MBs,
Z, Y and X , the probability that the outcomes of the
agents’ are correlated with those of Alice’s is 13PdPc. Sim-
ilar to Ref. [40], this eavesdropping check will find out
the eavesdropper monitoring the quantum channel from
Alice to her agents as any eavesdropping will leave a trace
in the outcomes of the decoy sampling photons.
For preventing the dishonest agent from eavesdropping
the process from the other agent to Alice freely, Alice
should also pick out randomly a sufficiently large sub-
set of the outcomes from the Bell-basis measurements on
the entangled quantum systems, and analyzes its error
rate, named it as the second check. It is useful for check
the security of the quantum channel when the photons
run from the two agents back to Alice. Moreover, it can
provide an estimate information for the postprocessing,
such as the error correct and the privacy amplification.
For half of these instances, Alice requires Bob first pub-
lish his operations and then Charlie, or vice versa.
4(6). If all the error rates are low than the threshold
εth, they can use the results remained as a raw key and
distill a private key KA = KB⊕KC with error correction
and privacy amplification [5]; otherwise, they will aban-
don the outcomes transmitted and repeat the quantum
communication from the beginning.
It is of interesting to point out the advantages that
Alice replaces some photons in the Bell states with the
decoy photons [37, 38]. If Alice does not exploit the de-
coy photons, a dishonest agent, say Bob can steal some
information with an opaque attack freely and fully [36],
especially when the transmission efficiencies lower than
50%. In detail, Bob intercepts the photon C when it is
sent from Alice to Charlie, and stores it with a quantum
memory. He prepares a fake EPR pair B′C′ in the state
|φ+〉B′C′ = 1√2 (| + z〉B′ | + z〉C′ + | − z〉B′ | − z〉C′) and
sends the photon C′ to Charlie, instead of the photon C.
If Charlie operates the photon C′ and sends it back to
Alice, Bob can capture this photon and take a Bell-state
measurement on the photons B′C′. He can obtain all the
information about the operations done by Charlie in this
way. On the other hand, if Charlie measures the photon
C′ with the MB Z, X or Y , Bob will get no photon in
the quantum signal sent from Charlie to Alice. He can
determine this condition with a quantum non-demolition
measurement, as same as that in Ref. [9, 39]. Subse-
quently, Bob can keep the photon B only when he gets
the outcome |φ+〉B′C . In this way, Bob’s eavesdropping
introduces no errors in the outcomes of the measurements
done by Bob and Charlie (or Alice and Charlie) no matter
what the MB chosen by Charlie is [36]. Certainly, Bob’s
eavesdropping will introduce errors in the outcomes if
Bob gets the other three Bell-basis results. However, Bob
can hide his eavesdropping with cheating [36]. That is, he
can announce that he gets nothing when he measures the
photon B as there are losses in the quantum line [36]. On
the other hand, without the decoy photons, Alice should
measure one EPR particle when the other EPR particle
is measured by her agent. For accomplishing this task,
she should first judge the photon number in each sig-
nal sent back by each agent, which will require Alice to
have the capability of taking a quantum non-demolition
measurement.
The process of eavesdropping check with decoy pho-
tons between Alice and Charlie does not require Bob to
participate in it, which will forbid Bob eavesdrop the
quantum channel from Alice to Charlie with an opaque
attack strategy [36]. The same process takes place be-
tween Alice and Bob. In essence, the process of the pho-
ton transmission from Alice to her each agent is similar
to the QKD protocol proposed by Lo et al. [40] which is
proven to be secure. That is, this process can be made
to be secure, same as QKD [35, 40].
After the operations done by the agents, the density
matrix of the quantum system composed of the photons
B and C is ρBC =


1/4 0 0 0
0 1/4 0 0
0 0 1/4 0
0 0 0 1/4

 for the dis-
honest agent, and he cannot copy the quantum signal
freely, similar to BB84 [35] and BBM92 [4] QKD proto-
cols. So this QSS scheme can be made to be secure,
which is in principle different from the QSS schemes
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22] in which the process
of checking eavesdropping is completed with the coop-
eration of the dishonest agent. On the other hand, as
the security of the process of the transmission from Al-
ice to her agents is ensured with the decoy photons and
that from the agents to Alice is ensured with the sam-
ples of the outcomes obtained with Bell-basis measure-
ments, this QSS scheme does not require the participants
to have the capability of storing quantum states. As for
the multi-photon attack [21], the agents can use a filter
to prevent a fake photon with a nonstandard wavelength
from entering their devices and use some beam splitters
to split the sampling signals chosen for eavesdropping
check before they measure the signals with the MB Z,
X or Y , same as that in Ref. [41]. Also, the parties can
complete a faithful qubit transmission against collective
noise with the technique in Ref. [42], which will improve
the practical efficiency in this QSS scheme.
Without the decoy photons prepared by Alice, this
QSS scheme can be made secure if both Bob and Charlie
have an ideal single-photon source. In detail, when Bob
(Charlie) chooses the checking-eavesdropping mode, he
measures the photon B (C) sent by Alice with one of the
three bases Z, X , and Y , and then sends a photon pre-
pared by himself to Alice. This photon can be randomly
in one of the six states {| ± z〉, | ± x〉, | ± y〉}. In this
way, the eavesdropper does not know which is the sam-
ple photon before Alice receives the entangled EPR pair,
and the opaque attack can be overcome as Alice can use
the photons inserted by her agents to check the security
of the transmission of photons from the agents to Alice.
In essence, the honest agent prepares the decoy photons
and uses them to prevent the potentially dishonest agent
from eavesdropping freely.
In fact, this QSS scheme is the modified version of the
KKI QSS scheme [15] with quantum dense coding and
decoy photons. But only those modifications increase its
intrinsic efficiency, the source capacity and the security
largely. Almost all the instances ((1 − Pd)(1 − Pc)2) are
useful for generating the raw key except for those cho-
sen for eavesdropping check, and each of the two-photon
entangled quantum system can carry two bits of infor-
mation. Moreover, the classical information exchanged
is reduced largely as the two agents need not publish
their MBs when they choose the coding mode with the
four local unitary operations. Then the efficiency for
qubits ηq = (1 − Pd)(1 − Pc)2 approaches 1 when Pd
and Pc are very small. As the two qubits in the entan-
gled states are transmitted double the distances between
the sender Alice and her agents, which equals to that
5Alice and her agents transmit four qubits, the total ef-
ficiency ηt =
2
4
(1−Pd)(1−Pc)2
1+Pc
in the present QSS scheme,
approaching 50% when Pd and Pc are very small. Cer-
tainly, in a practical application with a noisy quantum
channel, the efficiency for qubits cannot approach 1 and
the total efficiency is low than 50% as the probabilities
Pd and Pc cannot be arbitrarily small. The parties can
exploit error-avoiding codes to reduce the effect of noise
on the efficiencies, such as the faithful qubit transmission
technique with linear optics [42].
In summary, we introduce an efficient high-capacity
QSS scheme with quantum dense coding based on two-
photon entangled states. The two agents, Bob and Char-
lie choose the single-photon measurements on the sam-
pling photons with the three MBs randomly for eaves-
dropping check, and encode their information with four
local unitary operations, which make this QSS scheme
more convenient for the agents than some others [14, 15].
Almost all the entangled photon pairs can be used to ex-
change the random key and each photon pair can carry
two bit of information. The intrinsic efficiency for qubit
is double as that in KKI QSS scheme [15], and the source
capacity is four times as the latter with the photons run-
ning forth and back. Moreover, this scheme is secure with
decoy photons and the classical information exchanged
is reduced largely as the participants almost need not
compare their MBs for all the instances except for those
for eavesdropping check. As the efficiency for producing
three-particle entangled state is low than that for two-
particle entangled state, the present QSS scheme is more
practical with present technology than the first one pro-
posed by Hillery, Buz˘ek, and Berthiaume [14].
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